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Therapeutic Approach in
Moral Education: A Critical
Assessment

by Jan Hábl
Abstract:
This study aims to critically assess the socalled therapeutic approach in moral education,
which emerged in the postwar twentieth century,
in the western part of the world. The proponents
of the approach used different terms to express its
essence: value clarification method, or sometimes
the decision-making method or the critical thinking
method. These philosophies of education have the
common feature of a personalistic, non-directive,
or client-oriented approach to the individual.
Therefore, I will refer to them here as therapeutic.
Jan Hábl (doc, 2016, Charles University in Prague; PhD,
2009, University of Wales) is a professor of pedagogy at
universities in Hradec Králové and Ústí nad Labem (Czech
Republic) and a research fellow in Comenius Institute in
Prague.

There are many advocates, but some of the most
notable should be named: Carl Rodgers, Jean
Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Sidney B. Simon,
Louis Raths, and Merrill Harmin. For a proper
understanding of these approaches, it’s necessary
to review first the cultural-ideological context of
their origin. After that I will analyze and evaluate their key tenets, which I consider problematic. Specifically, we will scrutinize these problems: (1) the problem of process at the expense
of content, (2) the problem of devaluation of the
educator’s authority, (3) the problem of blurring
of moral concepts and standards, (4) the problem
of value pseudo-neutrality and indoctrination,
(5) the problem of individualism, subjectivism,
and relativism.
Key words:
Moral, education, therapeutic, method, indoctrination.
Historical and cultural context
Education, in the sense of therapeutic clarification of values (and all related concepts), was in
many ways a reaction to the postwar crisis of values and culture in general. The coming generation openly distanced themselves from the “morals” of their parents. In addition to freedom of
expression, emancipation of human rights, and
emphasis on autonomy, the prevailing sentiment
of the flower children was resistance towards the
“stale” culture that priggishly preached, commissioned, and taught. The culture of their fathers—
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because of the horrors of war that were still fresh
in their memories—had lost its moral legitimacy
and become more of a source of shame than
something to pass along pedagogically. From
such a background it was not surprising, therefore, that in the 1960s there arose a method that
emphasized discussion, openness, engagement,
no guidelines, and so on. The goal of the method
was neither the formation nor transmission of
any kind of specific “bag of virtues,” in the words
of Lawrence Kohlberg, or other moral material; it
was indoctrination, which was considered one of
the cardinal defects of all traditional educational
approaches.1 Teachers and educators of this new
type were given the task of helping students
think independently and critically, based on the
psychological assumption that if the individuals
themselves identified their own values, the internalization of those values would be easier and
more durable than if they were mediated by some
adult. The students were thus guided to discover,
classify, and develop their own values, that is, to
construct their own moral universe.
Experimental findings by developmental
psychologists such as Piaget and Kohlberg conveniently arrived just in time.2 Although their
theories of the moral and cognitive development
of the individual were not originally intended to
be educational, their application to pedagogy was
soon found. Different variations of Kohlberg’s famous micro-story dilemmas were used in lessons
as a tool for clarifying moral categories and values, a tool which was expected to both move the
students to a higher stage of moral development
and teach them independent moral judgment
and argumentation.
How does the method work in didactic practice? For illustration, I present two mini-stories:
Kohlberg’s now famous “Heinz’s Dilemma” and
“Sharon’s Dilemma” from the just-as-well-known
teacher’s handbook of Simon and his colleagues:3
A fatally ill woman lived in Europe. She suffered from a special kind of cancer. There existed a medicine that was recently discovered
by a pharmacist from the same town. To produce the medicine was very expensive, and
the pharmacist charged ten times more than
it cost him to make. Heinz, the husband of
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the sick woman, borrowed from everyone he
could and still had only half of the cost of the
medicine. He begged the pharmacist to lower
the price or allow him to pay it in installments. But the pharmacist wouldn’t budge.
Desperate, Heinz broke into the pharmacy at
night and stole the medicine.
Sharon and Jill were best friends. One day
they went shopping together. Jill was trying
on a sweater, when she suddenly put her jacket
on over it and left the store. The guard arrived
immediately afterwards, stopped Sharon and
asked the name of her friend who had fled the
store. At the same time, she threatened to call
the police if Sharon wouldn’t give the name.

The questions for discussion are obvious: Was
Heinz’s theft wrong or not? Should Sharon betray her friend or not? The discussion has to be
well-controlled didactically in order to fulfill its
task. Therefore, the authors present the following instructions. (1) Recapitulate the basic facts
of the story and ask a clear yes/no question. (2)
Give the students enough time to think through
the question and answer independently, ideally
in writing, and with justification. (3) Next, the
students say their answers aloud. If it happens
that most of the group agree, S. B. Simon recommends adding “balancing” information. For
example, if most of the class vote for giving the
name, the teacher can draw attention to the implications that this judgment would have on the
girls’ friendship, or bring a new variable into the
story—for example, what if Jill was from a weak
social background, and so on. (4) The teacher is
to lead the discussion in a fundamentally non-directive manner. No interfering unless necessary,
only steering it by means of questions—either
stimulating (if the discussion lags), or regulatory
(if the discussion gets off track) or clarifying (to
break down concepts or motives, etc.). Teachers
must also avoid the temptation to express their
own opinions (even though the students request
it) because that usually ends the discussion. (5)
The conclusion of the discussion should contain
a summary of the arguments (for and against),
as well as a re-stating of the beginning and ending opinions. Did the students change their view?

pological assumption of the innate goodness of
For what reason? And so on. Of course, the stohuman nature, the belief that people are unprobries and strategies can also be subject to thematic
lematically good—both ontologically and morchanges and adapted to the age and circumstancally. In the 20th century we first saw this domies of the group.
The method spread quickly and gained popunance of process over content in Carl Rogers’
larity. In addition to Simon’s handbook, which
personalistic concept of client-centered therapy.
became a bestseller, many other similar textbooks
Rogers says that people should accept themselves
were published. By the 1980s, however, the first
as “streams of becoming” in a life-long process
problems and criticisms had appeared. I will not
of self-actualization. Fully actualized individuals
here critique Kohlberg’s
would then see themselves
theory as a diagnostic tool
as a “fluid process, not a
Education, in the sense of
for identifying stages of
fixed and static entity […],
moral development (otha continually changing
therapeutic clarification of
ers have already done that),
constellation of potentivalues (and all related concepts),
but rather I will present a
alities, not a fixed quanwas in many ways a reaction to
critique of the didactic aptity of traits.”6 Later Rogers
the
postwar
crisis
of
values
and
plication.
explicitly states that the
culture in general.
Critics admit that this
process of self-realization
method brought about
applies to education as
some contribution to the moral educational dismuch as to therapy. “The teacher,” says Rogers,
cussion. If it is used prudently, that is, with sen“becomes a facilitator in the process of the stusitively chosen topics appropriate to the age and
dents’ self-definition […], a resource-finder […]”.
maturity of the children, circumstances, etc., this
He would want the quality of his relationship to
method can help make them sensitive to moral
the group to be such that his feelings could be
reality, sometimes even bringing them to a first
freely available to them, without being imposed
“awakening” —from, for example, the typical
on them or becoming a restrictive influence on
adolescent egocentrism, or even narcissism. From
them.”7
the viewpoint of the content of the selected topThis emphasis was enthusiastically corroboics, this method proved to be very attractive,
rated by many educators. William Glasser, for exespecially in the critical teen years—what adoample, in his book School Without Failure, bluntly
lescent isn’t interested in topics like sex, drugs, recondemns education aimed at specific moral
lationships, murders, or cannibalism (eating the
content as preaching: “We teach mindless conforlast survivor of a shipwreck on a deserted island).
mity to school rules and call the conforming child
Non-directive and group strategies entertain, en‘responsible.’”8 Simon, Howe, and Kirshenbaum
gage, or activate and thus motivate and stimulate
speak in a similarly unequivocal way when they
students—all results that are seen as the greatest
say that contents of a traditional curriculum are
didactic currency of this approach. But the criti“out-dated, moralistic” and strive after the “incism is massive.4
culcation of adult values into the youth,” and as
such are “indoctrination.” They, in contrast, seek
a higher goal, “the facilitation of the process of
Process at the Expense of Content
moral judgment.”9 The same appeal comes from
This therapeutic approach to moral education suffers, above all, from the “subordination of
the constructivist camp. A school that would prescontent for the benefit of the process,” says James
ent any kind of “objective morality” is compared
Hunter: The presentation of certain moral conto an “army camp,” and the teachers to “drill sertent (content-based instruction) is secondary and
geants.” Proper education should consist of drawcompletely overshadowed by questions about
ing out values only “as the need arises,” say Rheta
the “process whereby morality is acquired.”5 The
DeVries and Betty Zan. They continue, “we are
talking here about a process and not a product. In
ideological source of this approach is the anthroPro Rege—March 2018

3

this process, children wrestle with questions, what
to believe to be good and bad, right and wrong.
They form their own opinions and listen, listen
to the opinions of others. They construct their
own morality out of daily life experiences.”10 The
last thing a teacher should do is to “dictate moral
norms to the children.”11 Instead, a teacher should
“cooperate with the children by trying to understand their reasoning and facilitating the constructive process.”12
However understandable the resistance to traditional moral content is, and however welcome
the appeal for a helpful pedagogical climate, the
unilateral emphasis on the procedural side of
moral formation has had the effect over time of
emptying the contents of moral education as such.
The logic of the problem is simple: If the teacher
only therapeutically “recognizes, accepts and validates”13 students’ moral feelings and perceptions
without resorting to criticism (because it would
improperly interfere with the students’ process
of self-actualization), it’s inevitable that sooner or
later the teacher will agree with a completely immoral construction on the side of the student, a result which has also been confirmed in pedagogical
practice. Thomas Lickona recalls, from his clinical
research, the experience of a 9th- grade teacher who,
within the framework of ethical education, used
the technique of “voting on values.” The teacher
began the discussion with the question “Who of
you has ever stolen something from a store?” Most
of the students raised their hands. “Don’t you
think that stealing is bad?” Lickona comments
that the teacher forgot for a moment that such a
question violates the rule of value neutrality. “We
have a right to material things,” answered one of
the students, and the others nodded in agreement.
The teacher remained clueless.14
In addition to similar narrative testimonies,
there are many empirical studies that unsurprisingly support the idea that the suppression of the
content of education leads logically to its emptying of content, and ultimately to its malfunctioning.15 If the individual is not exposed to moral
content, there is nothing to develop; moral development simply does not appear.

4
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Devaluation of the Authority of the Educator
The imperative of therapeutic non-instruction is not only a matter of the teachers’ didactic
manner or conduct in the classroom; it basically concerns their social role. Proponents of the
methods described above encourage educators
to programmatically abdicate their traditional
role as ones who instruct, interpret, and present
moral content. We have seen a shift in the understanding of their role—teachers should act as facilitators or consultants, sometimes as assistants.
They still have the responsibility of organizing
classroom activities and academic discipline, but
the way of accomplishing it is different under the
therapeutic conception. In 1963 Jean Piaget said
that the “imposition of the authority” of an adult
is, in an educational context, “absurd” and “immoral.” In his judgment, an adult should only be
an “elder collaborator and, if he has it in him, a
simple comrade” to children.16
The same philosophy applied in Kohlberg’s
experimental community (Just Community)—
“students and teachers participate equally in the
creation and enforcement of rules.”17 Parents are
also encouraged to take the same approach: “To
achieve [the] parental goal of raising responsible
children who grow into responsible men and
women, parent-child relationships need to be
based on democratic principles […] of mutual
respect and equality.”18 To this, James Hunter
observes that the term “democracy” is used here,
but it is losing its specific historical meaning. The
original—Greek—usage of the term expressed
a way of organizing the political life of a society where the roles and relational responsibilities between the people (démos) and those who
lead them, were defined in a concrete way. But
educational therapeuticians use the term democracy without that context, and here it describes
the process of social organization without any
further identification. Thus, it becomes a code
or charm legitimizing the right of individuals to
participate and make decisions in any context.19
The consequences are predictable. The established structure of pedagogical authority loses its
social significance.

from their tendency towards wrong behavior and
Blurring of Concepts and Standards
also to motivate them towards correction, when a
The growing reluctance to convey any kind
wrong has been committed. But this potential is
of moral content, however objective, accompadependent on a shared consensus on the concepts
nied by the phenomenon of weakened teacher
of good and evil. By eliminating it, educators and
authority to safeguard the content, had the effect
therapists have made the concept of guilt powerof eroding moral terminology and, ultimately,
less and forbidden. The guilty one needs therapy,
moral standards as such. As in theory, so in pracnot punishment.
tice, the normative distinctions for seeing and
Hunter adds that neologisms such as the
clarifying good from evil were lost. The concepts
word prosocial are an unconcealed attempt to
of good and evil, right and wrong, did not comavoid the encumbrance of
pletely disappear, but they
the old moral categories.23
were redefined, a result
If
the
individual
is
not
exposed
that caused a fatal confuIn principle, the meaning
to moral content, there is
sion of terminology and
remains the same—sowas a source of misundercially positive or negative
nothing to develop; moral
standing.
behavior matches with the
development simply does
When, for example,
statement “what you did
not appear.
Kohlberg talks about mois good/bad,” but the hard
rality or immorality, these
emotional tip of the conare always relative terms, defined according to
cepts is broken off, and in addition the teachers
the level of moral judgment the individuals are
are enabled to distance themselves from termicapable of using in this or that period of their
nology that sounds judging or condemning. This
development. So as people evolve and become
phenomenon is well illustrated by the fact that
more “moral,” their morality is not the same as
the frequent use of the term prosocial didn’t used
becoming good. For example, if selfishness or
to be contrasted in literature with the word evil,
other character flaws appear in the judgment or
nor with antisocial. Rather, it was contrasted with
behavior of individuals, these are considered the
the somewhat amorphous word negative, in disresult of developmental or cognitive immaturity,
cussions about the deficiencies of pro-socialism,
or general inadequacy in their cognitive funcbut never to talk about evil.
tionality.20 Thus, the concept of good and evil has
If the moral concepts still appear in linguistic
usage, they do so only as categories of meaning
lost its ontological status, and with that also its
that individuals construct on the basis of their
objective meaning, and gradually also its meanexperience. Teachers, then, have the task of eningful referential framework in language, a loss
couraging students in that construction of moral
that Alasdair MacIntyre very aptly pointed out.21
reality, for example, by programmatically creatIn the therapeutic context, the concepts of
ing the opportunity for students to vote on rules
good and evil have slowly become outdated and
for classroom behavior or the values that will beincorrect, precisely because they have lost their
come the code of the group. But what happens
ability to relate to anything that would be conwhen the students—in their predictable invensidered as moral reality. Adam Philips notes
tion and creativity—vote, say, that someone who
that the therapeutic approaches have literally
doesn’t cheat is a “chicken” or maybe that they
developed a “phobia” to the word evil.22 I have
don’t wish to do certain school activities that repersonally observed a similar fate for the word
quire effort, such as grammar lessons or PE, on
guilt. The fact that there is a pathological form
the grounds that these activities don’t belong to
of this “emotion” has led to its stigmatization
their value system?
and the subsequent neglect of its healthy form.
The obfuscation of moral language is also
At the same time, the psychological strength of
evidenced by pedagogical practice based on the
guilt is, in terms of healthy moral development,
therapeutic approach. Critics point out that
irreplaceable. It has the “power” to save people
Pro Rege—March 2018
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the fundamental misgivings and dangers of the
method of moral dilemmas consist in their implicit relativization of moral principles. If students are programmatically exposed to unsolvable moral situations, they can get the impression
that all morality is “unsolvable,” i.e., problematic,
controversial, and ultimately relative. Students
who are confronted with one extreme situation
after another in which it isn’t clear whether they
should steal, lie, kill, or eat each other, in the end
become convinced that concepts such as good
and evil are completely vague—evidence of a
very sophisticated form of indoctrination because
it is carried out on a latent level.24 But is the starting point of the premise of this approach correct?
Is it possible to apply conclusions derived from
extreme situations to non-extreme situations?
From abnormal to normal? From exceptional to
common? Let us consider the example of Heinz’s
dilemma. In a life and death situation, stealing
seems acceptable, even moral. What would it
be for a person who puts morals (not stealing)
above human life? Does it follow from these extremes that stealing is permissible—even under
ordinary (or all) circumstances? The answer is
obvious (at least I hope so). And I believe that
neither Kohlberg nor any other supporters of the
critical method would agree with a conclusion of
unrestrained robbery. Nevertheless, the method
of moral dilemmas really leads to such a conclusion, even if the teacher is not aware of it.
Kilpatrick25 wonders how a dilemma about
theft could help young teenagers overcome the
temptation to steal money from their parent’s
wallet. He says that most of the moral situations faced by both children and adults are not
dilemmas: most moral choices are unambiguous.
We simply have to do what we know we should
do, and not do what we know we shouldn’t.
The time spent in school would be much better used by considering (and practicing) virtues
such as friendship, loyalty, and honesty rather
than focusing on unsolvable situations where
truthfulness seems wrong, friendship is separated
from honesty, and cannibalism is legitimized.
Kilpatrick further notes that the method of dilemmas, especially when applied to children at
an early stage of moral and cognitive develop6
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ment, is “woefully inadequate,” because it comes
out of the assumption that children already have
the “ABCs of morality,” and are therefore able to
cope with questions requiring a higher level of
moral judgment.26 In other words, Kilpatrick is
arguing that before children are exposed to moral
complexity (remember Sharon: “Is it right to be
loyal to a friend, or truthful to the authorities?”),
they should be taught the basics of morality (“Is
it right to steal this sweater?”). If that doesn’t happen, the youth are put into moral confusion because they are instilled with the preconceptions
that (a) suppress the basic moral intuition that
some things are really and unproblematically
good and some bad; and (b) lead to a contradiction between moral theory and moral practice.
However possible it is to instill and hold the theory of the relativity of moral norms, it cannot be
meaningfully applied in practice. We start teaching children from the time they’re in the sandbox that there are some things they cannot do to
others, and we say the same thing to criminals
in court.
Value Pseudo-neutrality and Indoctrination
Critics of therapeutic pedagogy point to the
fact that, in spite of their claim that the therapeutic approach is completely value-neutral, the
reality is the opposite. Kilpatrick presents an example of a favorite didactic strategy, “VV,” which
is Value Voting.27 The exercise begins with innocent questions like “How many of you like to
go for walks in the countryside?” or How many
of you love picnics?” or “How many of you love
yogurt?” But soon there appear questions like
“How many of you approve of premarital sex?”
or “Which of you are for legalizing abortion?” or
“How many of you are in favor of having homosexual couples married by priests, ministers, and
rabbis?” Kilpatrick points out that the authors of
the method have made no effort to separate the
heavy-value questions from the light ones. They
are intertwined as though there were no significant differences between them. The exercise is designed to give young people the impression that
“all values are questions of personal taste—as in
the case of yogurt,” says Kilpatrick. This kind of
design is not only not neutral, it is “indoctrinat-

is nothing more practical than good theory. If,
ing” because it deliberately and somewhat dehowever, the theory is dubious, the practical conceitfully instills the doctrine of value relativity.
sequences will be dubious too, even though the
Whether or not it is the teachers’ intention, if this
way is lined with good intentions.
method is used in pedagogical practice, it does
Not only the teacher but also the student is
indoctrinate (although students/teachers usually
outwitted here. They were promised a tool to
are not even aware of it).
“stimulate” moral thinking, which would lead
Proponents of the therapeutic method unto greater moral competence, but in reality they
derstandably don’t like to be associated with
were subjected to the process of methodological
such a—for them almost vulgar—word and
relativization of values. It
vehemently defend themis woven into the theraselves.28 Indeed, resistance
In the therapeutic context, the
peutic textbooks, not in a
to indoctrination was one
concepts of good and evil have
neutral way but skillfully
of the central motives of
(and probably unintenthe alternative approach.
slowly become outdated and
tionally) hidden. Despite
But the problem is that
incorrect, precisely because
the rhetoric of value neuthey defined the term inthey have lost their ability to
trality that it proclaims in
doctrination very vaguely.
relate to anything that would
theory, practice shows that
It didn’t occur to them that
be considered as moral reality.
the therapeutic educator is
they also held a set of speanything but neutral.
cific values and doctrines
that they perforce communicated to children
Individualism, Subjectivism, Relativism
by whatever indirect method. Once the term is
In light of what has been said, it is unsurprisdefined, it becomes clear that their approach fuling that therapeutic pedagogy has earned accufills every criteria of indoctrination. The definisations of moral subjectivism, accompanied by
tion of Downey and Kelley, to which Kohlberg
individualism and eventually leading to moral
referred in one of his apologies, is an illustration
relativism. Conservative theoreticians and pracof the problem. The triad of indoctrinating criteticioners of education have been thoroughly
ria—questionable content, questionable method,
heard from in this respect. See, for example,
questionable goals—is so general that even its
Kilpatrick’s bestseller, Why Johny Can’t Tell Right
proponents fall into it. They communicate notoFrom Wrong, first published in 1992. In the title,
riously questionable content or doctrine—values
the author makes a deliberate reference to the
are relative. They use questionable methods—the
earlier book by Rudolf Flesch, Why Johny Can’t
therapeutists’ preferred non-directive methods of
Read. In it, Flesch clarifies the reason for the failteaching. Non-directiveness, however, doesn’t
ure of certain didactic experiments carried out in
guarantee anything. Teachers may (and often
America in the postwar years. Briefly, the tradido) indoctrinate in a non-directive way. That
tional phonetic method of language teaching was
is, in effect, an effective trick. Intentional? asks
replaced by the “look-say” method, in which the
Kilpatrick.29 I won’t be as mistrustful as my colfocus of reading acquisition was transferred from
league here. I use the adjective “effective” as opteachers to students. The authors of the project
posed to “intentional” because I am not presumpromised greater engagement of students, which
ing that there is any premeditated or manipulawould lead to more effective acquisition of readtive intent. On the basis of my own pedagogical
ing skills. The reality was just the opposite, and
experience and personal interaction with fellow
the project was a total failure, but before it endteachers, I have come to the conclusion that few
ed (for a certain time it had the approval of the
teachers actually seek to relativize moral values
federal authorities), it produced a whole generaon the part of their students. Rather, I think that
tion of nearly illiterate “readers.” Kilpatrick says
users of the therapeutic method simply haven’t
that something similar happened in the area of
anticipated the implications of their theory. There
Pro Rege—March 2018
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moral education. In his judgment, the dramatic
decline in moral literacy, which can not only be
documented statistically but also seen with the
naked eye, is the consequence of implementing a
bad method. A whole generation of children have
been fooled by its moral relativism and are now
unable to recognize the good from the bad.
Proponents of therapeutic pedagogy defend
themselves against the accusation of relativism.
They say that their method “definitely promotes
the values of thinking, feeling, choosing, communicating, and acting” as well as “rationality,
justice, creativity, autonomy, and equality.”30 Alfie
Kohn denounces the “rampant individualism and
self-assurance” that threaten society as a whole
and argues for “community cooperation” as a key
goal of moral education.31 Abraham Maslow similarly explains that “valuelessness” is the “greatest
disease of our time.”32 The term democracy also often appears as a non-negotiable value that should
be promoted by moral or civic education. (There
is even a subject called Education to Democracy
or Democratic Thinking—as opposed to totalitarian thinking). The same goes with respect, tolerance, empathy, and the so-called Golden Rule.
So, no relativism?33
It is good, however, to ask all these sets of
values these questions: Where are they coming
from? On what ontological basis do they stand?
How are they anchored or validated? One way
to avoid meta-ethical problems is simply to assert that they are values of the type of universal maxims or ideals that are self-validating or
self-evident, and that no further justification is
needed. But such an evasive maneuver doesn’t
work in education. From the earliest age, children are wired in such a way as to need to know
the reasons for their actions, or the actions required of them. The instruction “you should” do
this or that, or behave in this way or that, calls
forth a child-like natural and unaffected desire
to know why. It’s true that there are “why” questions and developmental stages that really don’t
need an answer, such as “Why shouldn’t I touch
the burner?” But others literally cry out for an
answer: “Why should I be brave?” “Why must I
control myself?”
Most educators know this fact very well; and
8
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therefore, if possible, they look for good answers
or fundamentals, which would give meaningful
justification for moral values and rights—including therapeutic educators. But on what basis?
Moral ideals are rooted “neither in the conventions of social life or public discourse, nor in an
external or transcendent standard inherited from
any particular moral tradition,” explains Hunter;
and, he continues, “rather, these ideals are rooted
in the rights (the desires, feelings, needs and potentialities) of the autonomous individual. The
self, in brief, is both the source of all moral sensibility and the final object of moral accountability.”34 Rodgers can in many ways be considered
the father of this concept:
The individual increasingly comes to feel that
the locus of evaluation lies within himself.
Less and less does he look to others for approval or disapproval; for the standards to live
by; for decisions and choices. He recognizes
that it rests within himself to choose; that the
only questions that matters is “Am I living
in a way that is deeply satisfying to me, and
which truly expresses me?”35

Elsewhere he adds,
Everyone possesses the capacity to expand, extend, become autonomous, develop, mature.
[Moral capacity] exists in every individual
and awaits only the proper conditions to be
released and expressed. [...] Whether one calls
it a growth tendency, a drive toward self-actualization, or a forward-moving directional
tendency, it is the main-spring of life.36

In psychotherapeutic circles, Maslow speaks
similarly about people. Everyone has an “inner
core,” which “as much as we know of it so far, is
definitely not ‘evil,’ but is either what we adults in
our culture call ‘good’ or else it is neutral,” he explains.37 “Self-realization” and “self-fulfillment”
are, in his judgment, “instinctive.” Let Maslow
speak more extensively about human nature:
Man demonstrates in his own nature a pressure towards fuller and fuller Being, more
and more perfect actualization of his humanness in exactly the same naturalistic, scientific
sense that an acorn may be said to be “pressing

ought to be.”44 In other words, a value can become one’s own only through choice.
Pedocentrism of this type necessarily leads
to moral subjectivism and relativism, as is well
illustrated by the handbook of one of the therapeutic education programs with the title Growing
up Caring. Let’s consider two examples. In the
chapter on cheating in school, a student discovFathers of liberal education like Rousseau
ers a picture of a girl during an exam looking
would have rejoiced: no molding, no teaching, perover the shoulder of her classmate, with the acmission, letting the potential itself be actualized…
companying text: “Cheating, in any form, is
What potential? “Creativeness, spontaneity, selfbad for your self-esteem.”
hood, authenticity, caring
In another chapter in the
for others, being able to
A whole generation of children
book is a photograph of a
love, yearning for truth are
have been fooled by its moral
young girl who is stealing
embryonic potentialities
relativism and are now unable
from a store, while the next
belonging to his speciesto recognize the good from
picture shows two other
membership just as much
the bad.
people watching her and
as are his arm and legs and
recording it on camera.
brain and eyes.”39
The accompanying text says, “One way to test
The therapeutic educational concepts are,
the impact a decision will have on your feeling of
in their theory, true echoes of this anthropolself-worth is to imagine a picture being taken of
ogy. Again and again we read that “learning is
you implementing your decision.”45 The ethical
a process whereby meaning, ethical or otherwise, must be actively invented and reinvented,
argument of these instructions is clear—the chilfrom the inside out.”40 Or, write other authors,
dren are not led to believe that cheating or stealing are objectively wrong because they violate a
“The individual who is autonomously moral foluniversal law. Cheating is wrong because it calls
lows moral rules of the self. Such rules are selfforth an unpleasant feeling or threatens the selfconstructed, self-regulating principles”41 —hence
confidence of an individual. Such an argument is
the didactic emphasis on autonomous decisionalmost amusing to someone who grew up under
making and choice, which are so characteristic of
a totalitarian regime in the seventies and eightthis kind of education. True values “represent the
ies. In a culture deformed by Communist ideolfree and thoughtful choice of intelligent humans
ogy, people felt downright happy if they could
interacting with complex and changing environmanage to steal from the state-owned property,
ments.”42 But the values must be chosen freely,
or at least get around some law. After all, the best
else they’re not “right”; or, at least, they are “chopeople—from a moral perspective—were usually
sen from among alternatives,” but mainly, “after
“illegal” or in prison or exile. Things are different
independent consideration.” The imperative for
now in both the East and the West. The “feeling”
free choice has become so inviolable that educaargument no longer works today—the number of
tors have been encouraged to “help the children
individuals whose self-esteem would be lowered
look for value, as long as [emphasis mine] the chilby being exposed as a person who committed an
dren make the decisions. It is also possible that
unethical act is rapidly declining everywhere.
the children decide not to develop values. The
Subjectivism, which is behind the therapeuteachers’ responsibility is to support even such
tic concepts of pedagogy, has a direct connection
a decision.” 43 Kohn adds pregnantly, “children
with the “cultures” of ethical utilitarianism and
must be invited to reflect on complex issues, to
emotivism (sometimes called expressionism). In
recast them in the light of their own experience
utilitarianism, moral discourse determines the
and questions, to figure out for themselves—and
logic of expediency and usefulness; in emotionwith one another—what kind of person one
toward” being an oak tree, or a tiger can be
observed to “push toward” being tigerish, or a
horse toward being equine. Man is ultimately not molded or shaped into humanness or
taught to be human. The role of the environment is ultimately to permit him or help him
to actualize his own potentialities.38
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alism, the logic of psychological well-being. In
both cases, it is the individual I who arbitrates
moral prudence. In this frame of reference, the
most important moral act is that of choice, making a decision—not a decision for something, just
making a decision, period, and deciding it yourself—Jean Paul Sartre in pedagogical robes.
The results? Therapeutic pedagogies have
achieved their goals; and in doing so, they have
become part of the problem they wanted to solve.
The therapeutically raised generation is truly autonomous, at least to the extent that they have
ruled out any commitment that would go beyond the borders of subjective choice and personal
well-being. It is the logical result of programmatic
questioning of objective moral reality. If I am being convinced that the final arbiter of moral values is me or my feelings, eventually I will believe
it. If I am methodically urged to self-identify my
existence through free choice, I will eventually do
it. Who would have expected that, entirely freely,
I would choose evil? But it could have been expected—at least since Zimbardo and Milgram.46
But before them, Dostoyevsky already said it; and
before him, Aquinas, Augustine, Paul of Tarsus,
and many others.
In Place of Conclusion: The Abolition of Man
Many of the problems of the therapeutic approach were uniquely dealt with by C. S.
Lewis in his book The Abolition of Man, subtitled Reflections on education with special reference to the teaching of English in the upper forms
of schools. Lewis’s treatise crosses lines not only
in its form—concise, intense, brief, and all with
typical Lewis readability—but most of all in that
Lewis almost prophetically predicted the moral
problems that came later. Most observers or critics—including those I refer to here—normally
analyze the results of some phenomenon, but
Lewis, with unprecedented foresight, presented a
description of what was yet to come. Therefore,
he deserves special attention in the conclusion of
this paper.
The text of the book is based on three lectures Lewis gave in 1943.47 Lewis is reacting to
a textbook on the English language which—so
it wouldn’t offend anyone—was hidden under
10
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the designation “green book” by the pseudonymous authors “Gaius and Titus.” It was a book
written in 1939 called The Control of Language: A
Critical Approach to Reading and Writing, by Alex
King and Martin Ketley. Lewis analyzes the way
in which the authors of the textbook subvert the
students’ values—not only the moral ones. When
a value statement is made, such as “that waterfall
is beautiful,” the authors teach that it is only the
subjective statement of a specific feeling on the
part of the observer, not a statement about objective reality. We think we’re saying something important about something real, but we are actually
only saying something about our own feelings,
claim the authors. Lewis argues that such subjectivism in value judgments is flawed because
some subjects and some acts are actually real;
that is, they are objective and deserve an evaluation, whether positive or negative. A waterfall is
objectively beautiful, a villain is objectively evil.
Understandably, an ethics which doesn’t believe
in the reality of objective moral values will avoid
the concepts of good and evil. But if we replace
“good” with predicates like “necessary,” “progressive,” or “impressive,” we are using just a trick of
language, a linguistic ruse, says Lewis, who explains with the questions “necessary for what?
progressing towards what? effecting what? In the
last resort they [Gaius and Titus] would have to
admit that some state of affairs was in their opinion good for its own sake.” In other words—it
is good to call things by their right names and
cultivate an “ethics without predicates.”
According to Lewis, this ethics has been well
taught by good teachers from time immemorial.
Lewis reminds us of the thinkers of antiquity
such as Plato, Aristotle and Augustine, who, in
one way or another, cultivated “ordinate affections,” that is, teaching people to love that which
ought to be loved and to hate that which ought to
be hated—to love good and hate evil. Although
moral feelings and values are real, they don’t develop automatically in people, says Lewis. Hence
the need for education. Those who don’t have
these moral capacities are lacking the very thing
that would make them specifically human. They
would be, in Lewis’s words, “men without chests”
or “without hearts.” The Gaius and Titus book

to affect our very language.” 48 Man’s conquest
produces such people by undermining the fact
that people are capable of contact with objecof Nature turns out to be Nature’s conquest of
tive reality (moral, aesthetic or other) and thus
Man. Man’s power over everything destroys him.
taking away from them that which is humanely
Lewis called the process of conquering, when
the most valuable. (If such people were asked,
people sacrifice one thing after another, and fi“Do you think there is something real outside
nally even themselves, in order to gain power
of you—truth, goodness, beauty, the noumena?”
over nature and human nature, a “magician’s
they would answer, “No—there’s only you, the
bargain.” Faust’s metaphor illustrates the fact
subject, your impression,
that modern “science” has
phenomena, illusion.”)
the same goal as the anPedocentrism of this type
What will happen with
cient magic, which is the
the human world when we
submission of reality to the
necessarily leads to moral
explain away and thus dowishes of humankind—to
sujectivism and relativism, as is
mesticate moral reality? In
command the wind and
well illustrated by the handbook the rain, to gain that hidthe last part of his book,
of one of the therapeutic
Lewis gives an unbelieveous strength,49 which is in
education programs with the
ably accurate sketch of the
fact to become a god. To
contours of the modern
achieve their goal, they use
title Growing up Caring.
dystopia that should soon
magic and science to do
emerge if this demoralizing trend were tp conthings that have long been considered “disgusttinue. The power of human beings to do exactly
ing and impious.”
what they wish will grow with the so-called “conThe same applies to moral values and princiquest of nature,” that is, the development of the
ples. If they are conquered, people will have the
natural sciences. However, every new power acpower to freely modify, design, and even produce
quired by Man is, at the same time, “power over
them. Moral values and ethics are not things
man,” says Lewis. Therefore, it is good to ask
that determine a person, but things that persons
whose power grows with every further sublimathemselves determine however they see fit, a sitution of nature. Lewis predicts that if the dream of
ation that means the end of them. And this is the
some scientists becomes a reality and we humans
“tragi-comedy of our situation,” Lewis concludes:
“take control of nature,” it will mean the supremwe call loudly for precisely those qualities that we
acy of hundreds of people over billions of others.
ourselves have subverted: “In a sort of ghastly simThe final stage of conquest will be conquest of
plicity we remove the organ and demand the funcone’s self, that is, human nature. Human nature
tion. We make men without chests and expect of
will be the final bastion of the natural world that
them virtue and enterprise. We laugh at honor and
will be conquered. The victorious ruling minorare shocked to find traitors in our midst. We casity will become a caste of Conditioners, that
trate and bid the geldings be fruitful.”50
is, people who will have control tools (he mentions eugenetics, genetics and psychology) and
Disclosure statement
who will knead, form, and cut out the nature of
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the succeeding generations however they want:
by the author.
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